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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to explore the role of labour and trade unions in the repeated shifts of crisis 
phenomena over the past years. It addresses the question why, confronted with the very 
profoundness of the crisis, they have failed to develop politically relevant and socially progressive 
strategies so far. The presented argument not only refers to structural power relations but in 
particular to the political struggles and processes in which more far-reaching ambitions have been 
knocked into shape. In that context, the focus is above all on economic stimulus packages, financial 
market regulation, and current budget consolidation. 
The paper will be organised as follows: It will start with some general problems of trade unions in 
generating sufficient power and organisational capacities against the background of the unfolding 
crisis within the European Union (EU). The next section empirically highlights these developments 
by discussing the cases of Germany, France, and Spain. The paper then concludes highlighting 
common challenges and chances, but also the difficulties to form new progressive European 
alliances. 
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1. Introduction
Six years have passed since the outbreak of the so-called subprime crisis in the US. Like a 
chameleon taking different colours, the crisis, particularly in Europe, took different shapes 
embodying an extension of crisis phenomena. That is, the subprime crisis became a global financial 
crisis, before turning into a sovereign debt and euro crisis, and also increasingly into a deep social 
and democratic crisis. Rising unemployment, skyrocketing youth unemployment, cuts in welfare and 
public infrastructure and spreading poverty are the meanwhile well-known facets of social crisis 
tendencies. At least partly, these developments have also nourished a new wave of protest, strikes 
and other forms of resistance (Schmalz and Weinmann, 2013) so that the International Labour 
Organization (2013: 14) identified sharp ‘increases in the risk of social unrest’ in some crisis-ridden 
countries, while in most countries of the European core such as Belgium, Germany, Finland, Slovak 
Republic or Sweden ‘the risk of social unrest declined’ (ibid.). 
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The diverging socioeconomic situation within the EU is the outcome of uneven capitalist 
development, aggravated by an unequal severity of the course of the crisis (Becker and Jäger, 2012). 
The unequal impact of the crisis has very specific consequences for domestic labour markets, 
industrial relations, and welfare regimes. Consequently, it represents a serious challenge for trade 
unions to develop common or at least transnationally co-ordinated European strategies. On the one 
hand, unions of the more competitive current account surplus countries are rather inclined to 
continue and adjust their competitive corporatist arrangements to the new crisis constellation. 
Primarily relying on their institutional power base, i.e. their involvement in labour and social policy-
making, they remain willing to acquiesce to wage moderation, more flexible working conditions or 
privatised social services in exchange for maintaining employment. On the other hand, in the less 
competitive current account deficit countries, heavily shaken by the financial crisis and its 
consequences, trade unions proved unable to practice such strategies of ‘crisis corporatism’ (Urban, 
2012). Due to comprehensive disciplinary and cost-cutting labour and social policies, the tensions 
within inherited corporatist arrangements intensified; in many cases to such an extent that previous 
institutional settings dissolved.  
This indicates that the multiple European crises represent specific but interconnected 
challenges to the European trade union movement (Baccaro et al., 2010). Two of them are 
particularly important. A first challenge results from the transition from an active crisis management 
based on comprehensive economic stimulus programmes towards the establishment of a European 
austerity agenda from early 2010 onwards. This change was promoted by the owners of financial 
assets and the ordo-liberal stance of the German government which were mainly concerned by 
increasing public debt and the prospective dangers of inflation. In practice, the austerity agenda was 
partly executed by the administrative troika of financial stabilisation funds, i.e. the European 
Commission, European Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF); otherwise, it 
became legally based on a couple of procedural economic governance reforms. Although European 
trade unions were and still are generally critical of the European austerity agenda, they have 
difficulties in forming a common strategic response. These difficulties also refer to a second challenge 
which, as outlined above, stems from the diverging national views on appropriate European and 
domestic crisis strategies. While some unions remain focussed on given institutional settings, others 
broadened their activities, became more engaged in European debates, and aimed to align with 
social protest movements. The diverging strategic priorities are explicable by both, given models of 
capitalist development labour relations are part of the prevailing public discourses and political 
convictions – as will be discussed in three case studies below. At the same time, however, this 
divergence makes it even more difficult for trade unions to contribute to the emergence of a 
powerful strategy of an alternative European crisis management. 
This paper aims to explore the possibility of trade unions coming to terms with this twofold 
challenge. For this purpose it tries to reflect on the implications of the European constellation for 
trade unions and takes a closer look at the specific national constellation in three member states. In 
order to do so, we first differentiate between the overall political economic European situation and 
national developments; and second, between the different national developments themselves which 
are characterised by a specific course of the crisis and by particular power relations and inherited 
institutional welfare states, industrial relations, and labour market settings often inclusive of certain 
modes of – corporatist – union involvement. More concrete, the paper will be structured as follows: 
the next section outlines some general problems of trade unions in generating sufficient power and 
organisational capacities against the background of the unfolding crisis within the EU. It shows that 
European trade unions first have been inclined towards a kind of (self-)imposed pragmatism. Yet as 
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the crisis shifted to affect public budgets, public services, social security systems, and the labour 
markets, not only distributional but also cultural and ideological conflicts have become more 
intense. The following section empirically highlights these developments by discussing the cases of 
Germany, France, and Spain. These studies offer valuable insights into the conditions and nature of 
trade unions’ strategic considerations and also into the political struggle on the content and social 
purpose of economic stimulus packages, financial stabilisation, and budget consolidation measures. 
Finally, the paper concludes with some apparent challenges and chances, but also the difficulties to 
form new progressive European alliances. 
 
 
2. Perceptions and strategies of trade unions against the background of the 
unfolding European crisis  
Recent debates within the European trade union movement are not only shaped by 
European crisis dynamics but also by the more long-term experiences of structural weakness and 
political defensive. Of course, these experiences differ among EU member states. At the same time, 
there are some overarching trends which support the argument of generally weakened trade unions. 
For instance, the level of unemployment structurally increased and remained fairly high since the 
early 1980s while different forms of non-standard employment such as part-time, fixed-term or 
temporary work gained in importance. This not only applied to employment in the services sector 
but also in production. As a consequence, in most countries and sectors the structural power of 
trade unions, derived from the overall position of the employees in the labour markets, diminished.2 
Yet not only structural, but also organisational labour power, i.e. the capacities of unions to tie and 
to politically enforce the interests of employees, declined remarkably. Relevant indicators of this 
tendency are declining union density rates (Table 1), while only some new and smaller unions 
representing particular occupational groups such as doctors, pilots, or train drivers gained influence 
(see for Germany: Schroeder and Greef, 2014: 124). 
 
Table 1: Trade union density rates in selected EU member states 
 
Country  1980 1990 2000 2007 2010 
Austria  56.7%  46.9%  36.6%  29.9%  28.4% 
France  18.3%  10.0%  8.0%  7.6%  7.9% 
Germany*  34.9%  31.2%  24.5%  19.9%  18.6% 
Greece  39.0%  34.1%  26.5%  24.5%  25.4%** 
Hungary ---  83.1%  21.7%  16.9% --- 
Italy  49.6%  38.8%  34.8%  33.5%  35.5% 
Portugal  54.8%  28.0%  21.6%  20.8%  19.3% 
Spain  18.7%  12.5%  16.7%  14.7%  15.6% 
Sweden  78.0%  80.9%  80.1%  71.0%  68.9% 
the Netherlands  34.8%  24.3%  22.6%  20.2%  19.3% 
UK  51.7%  39.7%  30.1%  27.4%  27.1% 
* data until 1990 only for West Germany 
** data of 2011 
Source: ICTWSS database (version 4.0) of Jelle Visser 
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In order to compensate for the erosion of structural and associational power, from the 1990s 
onwards many trade unions within the EU focussed on strengthening the institutional dimensions of 
power, i.e. procedural involvement in debates and decisions in the area of social and labour policies. 
In that context, the disposition of unions to engage with competitive corporatist arrangements met 
the aims of national governments and employers’ associations to push through and flank market-
liberal reforms without generating major social upheavals (Rhodes, 1998). The emergence of 
‘competitive corporatism’ or ‘new social pacts’ (Hassel, 2009) was therefore mainly based on 
concession bargaining in the form of wage restraint, longer and more flexible working hours, and 
welfare reforms in exchange for certain tax cuts and employment promises. Besides, the pacts were 
further backed up by the overall aim to fulfil the requirements of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU), since the mentioned reform packages contributed to lowering inflation rates and budget 
deficits (Bieling and Schulten, 2003). 
The effects of changed strategic priorities were ambiguous. On the one side, the corporatist 
arrangements of the 1990s and 2000s contributed to complying with the obligations of EMU as well 
as with the reform of labour markets and social security systems proposed within the context of the 
European Employment Strategy and the Lisbon Strategy. Overall, the rate of employment increased 
or was stabilised at least. On the other hand, quite a few unions became increasingly sceptical 
whether this modest ‘success’ was worth its price. Especially, since discontent among their members 
gained weight, in view of far reaching collective bargaining concessions, the expansion of non-
standard, often precarious employment, market liberal reforms of welfare systems and public 
infrastructure, the abdication from promoting own socio-political concepts and a further erosion of 
capabilities to strike and face public conflicts (Cafruny and Ryner, 2007: 73ff). These negative 
effects of competitive corporatist arrangements became even more problematic as a complementary 
strategic orientation, namely the strengthening of the European ‘social dimension’ via institutional 
involvement on the supranational level, e.g. in the context of the social dialogue and the Open 
Method of Co-ordination (OMC), reached its limits. European trade unions responded differently 
to these developments and aimed to strengthen the following strategic components (Erne, 2008: 
20ff). 
 
• A first component was a more critical attitude towards the institutional involvement in 
competitive corporatist or technocratic supranational arrangements. At least gradually, trade 
unions showed more open for alternative political options the more the socio-economically 
precarious and disciplinary nature of most reform proposals was evident, while any positive 
achievements such as job guarantees in the fields of labour policy or social policy became 
unlikely. 
 
• Secondly, some unions focussed increasingly on the development of an autonomous internal 
transnational dialogue by co-ordinating their collective-bargaining strategies. Such 
coordination initiatives aimed at realising a neutral distribution of inflation and productivity 
increases among capital and labour (Schulten, 2002). Practically, they were difficult to 
realise in view of nationally specific systems of collective bargaining and the indirect impact 
of social and tax policies on wage developments. Nevertheless and more important, they 
have partially generated some forms of cross-border class awareness which further initiatives 
can built upon. 
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• In addition to that, the cooperation with social movement organisations, especially with the 
globalisation critical ones, intensified, too (Bieler, 2011). Indicators of this third strategic 
component were the organisation of the European Social Forum (ESF) (Gajewska, 2008: 
116ff) and common protest activities directed against the so-called ‘Bolkestein’ or services 
directive, the liberalisation and privatisation of public services and infrastructure, the 
restriction of fundamental social rights in the name of superior European economic freedoms 
or particular European crisis summits. 
 
The listed tendencies show that strategic debates within European trade unions adopted 
some elements of the conception of a ‘social movement unionism’ (Brinkmann et al. 2008) and at 
least partially revitalised, broadened, and politicised their activities. It would be, however, 
exaggerated to interpret these tendencies as an expression of a new political paradigm. To the 
contrary, they only represented cautious and partially diverging efforts to revise and modify the 
prevailing strategies. Moreover, confronted with the unfolding of the global and European financial 
crisis, the strategic uncertainty and divergence was further stimulated, as labour and social policy 
implications of the crisis, and the experiences of employees and trade unions,varied. Depending on 
the specific integration into the global, particularly the transatlantic economy, the crisis contagion in 
Europe took different forms: one was via financial markets since the transatlantic activities of 
European financial firms and investors caused bank failures and a serious credit crunch; and the 
other was via trade relations since the slump in consumption and investment in the US caused a 
decline in European exports. In addition to these two forms of contagion, the internal European 
macroeconomic imbalances and the specific problems of countries with both a serious current 
account deficit and a budget deficit, increasingly determined the course of the financial crisis within 
the EU. With respect to the concrete socio-economic features it is possible to identify different 
groups of EU member states (Bellofiore, Garibaldi and Halevi, 2010; Schmidt, 2011; Becker and 
Jäger, 2010, 2012; Bohle and Greskovits, 2012). 
 
• First, there are those countries whose banks and financial firms were very active in trading 
with ‘subprime credits’, Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs) and other risky financial 
assets. These countries (UK, Ireland and partially also the Benelux countries and Germany) 
were hit soon and rather hard by the crisis due to their close linkages with the US economy. 
While Germany and the Benelux countries recovered relatively fast, the UK, and particularly 
Ireland, suffered severe damage as a consequence of their large financial sectors. 
 
• A second group comprises countries – mostly in southern Europe – which belong to the 
eurozone but suffer from deteriorating competitiveness. In the course of the crisis, the 
situation became particularly problematic for those countries which have not only been 
confronted with structural current account deficits but also with high levels of private and 
increasingly public indebtedness such as Italy, Portugal, Spain and particularly Greece. To 
the extent that the latter restricted the economic and social policy capacities of national 
governments, the prospects to confront worsened social conditions – e.g. through short-time 
work or active labour market policies – became gloomy. 
 
• The third group of central and eastern European transition economies includes the so-called 
Visegrád countries and the Baltic countries. The Visegrád countries have been following a 
development trajectory of ‘dependent industrialisation’ and therefore suffered most from 
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shrinking exports to Western Europe and the US. The Baltic countries followed the 
trajectory of ‘dependent financialisation’ based on comprehensive privatisation programmes, 
speculative housing bubbles and overvalued national currencies which generated an 
increasing current account deficit and credit inflows; a constellation highly problematic in 
times of increasingly restrictive credit provision on the part of western banks. 
 
To understand the course of the crisis and the trade union responses within the EU it is, 
however, not sufficient to look at its spatial pattern and country-specific particularities. It is also 
necessary to differentiate between two major periods of European crisis management marked by 
particular (socio-)economic problems, political discourses and instruments. The first period lasted 
from summer 2007 until the end of 2009. During this time, most politicians turned towards a fairly 
pragmatic and interventionist crisis management. They aimed at stabilising financial markets 
through public guarantees and nationalisation measures. The ECB accompanied this process with 
generous injections of liquidity in order to counteract the looming bottlenecks in the interbank 
market. And in late 2008/early 2009, finance ministers coordinated their economic stimulus 
programmes within the framework of a so-called European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) 
inclusive of some measures to maintain employment (Hacker and van Treeck, 2010). 
All in all, this first period of state interventionism aimed at stabilising the system was fairly 
costly. Bank rescues, economic stimulus programmes, and automatic stabilisers – lower taxes and 
social contributions but additional expenses – led to a remarkable increase of public debt; on 
average about 23 percentage points from 2007 to 2011 (Bieling, 2011; Schelkle, 2012). It was above 
all this context which allowed market-liberal politicians, economists, and journalists to launch the 
discourse on the ‘sovereign debt crisis’. From early 2010 onwards, this discourse had the effect that 
European crisis management became primarily concerned with the definition and implementation of 
austerity politics.3 Hence, in line with the exit-strategy, most governments started to launch 
consolidation packages. First, they did this on their own accords; and then the EU – particularly the 
European Commission and the creditor countries – pushed for stricter common rules and 
procedures for budgetary consolidation (Heinrich and Kuttler, 2014). Those efforts have led to: the 
introduction of a ‘European semester’, i.e. a fairly comprehensive procedure of supervising and 
controlling national economic and fiscal developments; the passing of a ‘six pack’, a bunch of six 
legislative acts all designed to strengthen the disciplinary nature of the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP); a declared willingness of most governments to coordinate their socio-economic policies more 
closely within the framework of the ‘Euro plus pact’; and a ‘fiscal union’ inclusive of a general 
national constitutionalisation of a ‘debt brake’. 
The initiatives and measures point unambiguously to a generalised European austerity 
agenda. Among other things, this implies a shrinking public sector, lower wages for civil servants, 
reduced social services, a higher effective retirement age, further flexibilised labour markets, and 
collective bargaining results below productivity increases. On average, this applies to all member 
states of the EU and the eurozone (Degryse, Jepsen and Pochet, 2013; Hermann, 2013). Yet besides 
this general trend, some countries are more severely affected than others. The differences concern 
political pressures on governments and collective bargaining partners, as they are particularly hard 
for those countries whose governments have to comply with the reform agenda of the so-called 
troika − ECB, IMF and European Commission − as they have drawn from the credit lines offered by 
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) or the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
(Müller and Schulten, 2013). Besides, the differences also concern the overall socio-economic 
development within the EU. While in some countries the financial and economic crisis was 
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contained and overcome by an active political crisis management, other countries had only weak 
capacities and entered a vicious circle of economic recession, increasing public debt and hard austerity 
measures which in turn made the crisis permanent (Busch, Hermann, Hinrichs and Schulten, 2013). 
This divide of the European development is not only illustrated by diverging economic growth rates 
(Table 2) and labour market trends, above all the figures of (youth) unemployment (Table 3), but 
also concerns the strategic options and actions of trade unions. 
 
Table 2: Annual Growth of GDP (in %) in selected EU Member States 
 
COUNTRY 2004-08 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013* 2014* 
EU 27 2.3 -4.3 2.1 1.5 -0.3 0.1 1.6 
FRANCE 1.8 -3.1 1.7 1.7 0.0 0.1 1.2 
GERMANY 2.0 -5.1 4.2 3.0 0.7 0.5 2.0 
GREECE 3.1 -3.1 -4.9 -7.1 -6.4 -4.4 0.6 
IRELAND 3.8 -5.5 -0.8 1.4 0.7 1.1 2.2 
ITALY 1.1 -5.5 1.8 0.4 -2.2 -1.0 0.8 
PORTUGAL 1.2 -2.9 1.9 -1.6 -3.2 -1.9 0.8 
SPAIN 3.1 -3.7 -0.3 0.4 -1.4 -1.4 0.8 
THE 
NETHERLANDS 
2.7 -3.7 1.6 1.0 -0.9 -0.6 1.1 
UK 2.2 -4.0 1.8 0.9 0.0 0.9 1.9 
* Forecast from Winter 2013 
Source: European Commission (2013: 112) 
 
 
Table 3: Unemployment (general/youth in %) in selected EU Member States 
 
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
EU  7.2/15.7 7.1/15.8 9.0/20.1 9.7/21.1 9.7/21.4 10.5/22.8 
France  8.4/19.8 7.8/19.3 9.5/24.0 9.7/23.6 9.6/22.8 10.3/24.6 
Germany  8.7/11.9 7.5/10.6 7.8/11.2 7.1/9.9 5.9/8.6 5.0/8.1 
Greece  8.3/22.9 7.7/22.1 9.5/25.8 12.6/32.9 17.7/44.4 24.3/55.3 
Ireland  4.7/9.1 6.4/13.3 12.0/24.0 13.9/27.6 14.7/29.1 14.7/30.4 
Italy  6.1/20.3 6.7/21.3 7.8/25.4 8.4/27.8 8.4/29.1 10.7/35.3 
Portugal  8.9/20.4 8.5/20.2 10.6/24.8 12.0/27.7 12.9/30.1 15.9/37.7 
Spain  8.3/18.2 11.3/24.6 18.0/37.8 20.1/41.6 21.7/46.4 25.0/53.2 
the Netherlands  3.6/7.0 3.1/6.3 3.7/7.7 4.5/8.7 4.4/7.6 5.3/9.5 
UK  5.3/14.3 5.6/15.0 7.6/19.1 7.8/19.6 8.0/21.1 7.9/21.0 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
3. Strategic (re-)orientations of unions in key EU member states 
The negotiation and definition of pending political answers to current socio-economic 
problems take place in this complex and partially confusing European context. What this implies in 
terms of the modes of institutional involvement is itself defined by the course of the crisis but 
remains open to political struggles. Hence, in the first period of European crisis management – 
characterised by bank rescues and economic stimulus packages – at least partially, unions gained 
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some political and institutional influence and pushed for stronger and more active industrial and 
labour market policies. In this sense, it was justified to speak of the emergence of a new ‘crisis 
corporatism’ (Urban, 2012: 227ff). This type of corporatism was based on a tripartite management 
of acute crisis processes closely related to the emergence of transnational financial capitalism. The 
mode of reproduction of this kind of capitalism was, however, not only responsible for recent crises 
phenomena. It also implied fundamental changes within societal power relations. Due to its 
structurally hegemonic position, financial capital was able to transpose large parts of the burden of 
crisis management to production, the public and labour, whose representatives − employer 
associations, governments, and trade unions − formed emergence coalitions to ward off a deeper and 
more substantial collapse of prevailing models of capitalist development. 
Meanwhile, it seems, however, that this type of ‘crisis corporatism’ only survived in the 
economically stronger countries with long corporatist traditions and current account surpluses. For 
in the second period of crisis management, i.e. with the definition and implementation of a 
European austerity agenda, disciplinary pressures on public expenditures, social services, and wages 
increased (Theodoropoulou and Watt, 2011: 18ff; Heise and Lierse, 2011: 509ff; Busch et al., 
2013), particularly in the highly indebted countries with negative current accounts. It is therefore no 
surprise that in many European countries corporatist arrangements became more fragile or even 
dissolved (Glassner, Keune and Marginson, 2011; Glassner, 2013; Carley and Marginson, 2011). 
Whether there is a split of the EU into a ‘crisis corporatist’ Nordic style and a ‘post-corporatist’ 
southern style4 will be subsequently discussed in three case studies of EU members – Germany, 
France, and Spain – with different traditions of welfare regimes and industrial relations systems and 
differently affected economies and labour markets. That is, Germany can be seen as a case for a 
‘crisis corporatist’ country, France represents a special case and Spain shows signs of ‘post-
corporatism’.5 
 
 
3.1 GERMANY 
Next to the Netherlands and Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany was traditionally 
regarded as the prime example for strong and centralised trade unions and a fairly comprehensively 
institutionalised collective bargaining system usually left untouched by state interventions 
(‘Tarifautonomie’). For a long while, the development of the German collective bargaining system 
benefited from the dynamic evolution of the particular capitalist development based on a strong 
industrial export sector, a dual training and education system, an effective financial system and 
public sector, and supportive welfare arrangements (Simonis, 1998). In the last decade, however, the 
German collective bargaining system has shown signs of erosion: increasing pressure comes ‘from the 
financialisation of corporate governance, the systematisation of inter-site competition and, not least, 
the low growth rates in the German economy’ (Lehndorff, Bosch, Haipeter and Latniak, 2009: 
121). Furthermore, the export oriented character of the German economy put wage negotiations 
under competition pressures. Other changes include the increasing fragmentation of the labour 
market with a steadily growing segment of atypical employment relationships. In addition to that, 
the conservative welfare state with its strong orientation towards the male breadwinner norm and 
lifelong full-time employment exacerbates the situation of those at the margins of the labour market. 
With regards to the role of trade unions, developments in Germany have been accompanied 
by serious challenges to their position. For one, membership has been steadily declining. The union 
density rate has dropped significantly: in 2010, it was at 18.6% when in 2000, it had been at 24.6% 
(Visser, ICTWSS). Apart from the obvious decline in membership, other challenges have been 
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observed before the crisis. In the umbrella organisation Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB), only 
about one third of all members are women. This points to several structural issues for the DGB and 
its unions. First of all, they have not been able to develop a strong membership base in the services 
sector where most Germans work nowadays and where there is a disproportional high number of 
women. Secondly, part-time workers (again, the majority of those are women) as well as other forms 
of reduced or atypical working time and employment such as fixed-term work contracts or posted 
workers often remain excluded from trade unions’ actions and demands (Ebbinghaus and Göbel, 
2014: 225ff). This also affects the age structure of trade unions as young people more often find 
themselves in fixed-term work contracts; according to eurostat 53.6% of all young people (age 15-
24) in employment were temporary employees in 2012. All this is a major challenge for trade unions 
in terms of acquiring members as well as keeping them and topics to be covered and put on public 
agendas.  
As opposed to the other two countries considered in this article, the main German trade 
unions are not divided by politics and have traditionally been close to the social-democratic party 
(SPD). This relationship, however, has also eroded, particularly under the chancellorship of Gerhard 
Schröder (1998-2005, SPD) under whom the SPD had reoriented itself towards a more market-
liberal approach epitomised in the so-called ‘Agenda 2010’ which restructured the labour market 
accordingly (Butterwegge, 2006: 219f). In addition to somewhat losing their influence on political 
parties and politics, trade unions have followed a strategy of wage self-restraint which fits with the 
neo-mercantilist German model strongly based on export (Lehndorff et al., 2009: 125; Bellofiore et 
al., 2010). By the same token, collective bargaining was becoming more decentralised strengthening 
competition between firms that are bound by collective agreements versus ‘those not so bound’ 
(Lehndorff et al., 2009: 122). Competition pressures by transnationalised companies and European 
integration exacerbating the effect of a ‘disembeddening’ of firms from the reach of nationally 
organised trade unions (Hyman, 2001: 289) were felt and thus influenced collective bargaining 
institutions and unions’ strategies and especially the discourse and perception of what the 
possibilities of action were. To sum up, the position of trade unions in Germany was facing serious 
challenges and problems before the outbreak of the crisis. The strategies taken on during the crisis 
are thus even more important to the future of German trade unions.  
All in all, Germany (a current account surplus country) was hit hard by the crisis but 
recovered very quickly which all in all, made for a comparatively low crisis impact. Due to its – 
compared to others – moderate degree of financialisation but strong export orientation, Germany 
felt the crisis through the banks’ entanglement with risky financial assets and then more through the 
second channel of contagion: the decline in external demand. While the GDP contracted by 5.1% 
in 2009 but grew by 4.0% in 2010, and 3.3% in 2011, 0.7% in 2012 and 0.4% in 2013 (eurostat), 
the employment rate numbers developed surprisingly well and recently reached record levels (2009: 
70.3%, 2012: 72.8%, eurostat). The other side of this coin is the further dualisation and 
fragmentation of the labour market encompassing more and more people in atypical employment. 
The relatively well-faring of Germany through the crisis is often attributed to the quick responses 
and well-functioning of the collective bargaining institutions. Short-term work arrangements were 
extended in the first ad-hoc reactions to the crisis with the extension of the Kurzarbeit scheme and 
the use of time accounts managed to preserve a lot of jobs at the core workforce that would 
otherwise have been lost (Urban, 2012: 230). In addition to that, the metal workers’ union IG 
Metall had managed to negotiate the ‘cash for clunkers’ system as part of the state’s stimulus package 
(Konjunkturpaket II). Furthermore, investments in the public infrastructure were effected in order to 
maintain demand in the construction sector. So while a form of ‘crisis corporatism’ worked well in 
  162
Germany – in particular for the traditionally strong metal workers’ union IG Metall – during the first 
phase of the crisis and probably due to the fact that Germany could rely on well-established and 
traditionally strong institutions of collective bargaining, the second phase of the reactions to the 
crisis presented actors with much more conflict and tensions. 
This second phase is marked by austerity policies that are especially hard to swallow for 
trade unions. The existing problems surface again and are partially exacerbated by the crisis. While 
the export oriented industrial sectors prosper again, the public sector and certain services such as the 
hospitality and retail industries are susceptible to cost-cutting pressures. That is, the segmentation 
of the labour market is pushed further and a drop in working conditions has also been observed 
(European Commission, 2010: 65). Although the EU has recommended to align wages with 
productivity developments (Degryse et al., 2013: 24), trade unions have not been able to catch up 
on the lost decade of real wage stagnation during the 2000s. Apart from the fact that the discussion 
about a statutory minimum wage has been revitalised (Lehndorff, 2012: 93) and is now on its still 
long way to being gradually implemented by the new Grand Coalition government of the Christian 
Democratic Party and the Social Democratic Party (Bundesregierung, 2013: 68), no new topics 
have emerged or gained momentum. With regard to that, especially a pan-European sentiment of 
solidarity that would at least problematize the effects of wage restraint in Germany for other 
European countries and better yet mobilise against austerity measures across Europe, is not able to 
properly stick in public discourse and in the consciousness of large parts of the German society. The 
sentiment that Germany has mastered the crisis very well is widespread and leaves few opportunities 
for critique.  
In conclusion, German trade unions seem to react rather slowly to new challenges and are 
unhappy to forego institutional power in return for more mobilisations. This can also be observed 
with regards to new strategies such as the connection with other social movements or new forms of 
unionising such as campaigning (Brinkmann et al., 2008: 111). Apart from that, it remains to be 
seen how strong trade unions come out of the second phase of the crisis. While crisis corporatism 
seems to have worked well in the first phase, in the second phase of austerity policies, it puts 
German trade unions in a difficult and again weaker position. Having just negotiated certain 
compromises in the political reactions towards the crisis, they would lose credibility seemingly 
turning around now when mobilising too strongly against governmental action. As the effects of the 
austerity package unfold differently for different groups of society and a lot of processes are not 
shock-like but rather of a creeping character such as the increasing precarisation, trade unions find it 
hard to define a core problematic connecting those different groups of society and problematizing 
those issues. Furthermore, at this point, austerity policies are cushioned by Germany’s strong 
position in the European context. In the long run, however, German trade unions need to figure out 
a strategy that achieves strong results for their members and makes them more attractive to new and 
as yet underrepresented members such as atypical workers, women, and young people. This could 
include a more confrontational and demanding style in wage bargaining – especially in times of 
apparently good economic performance – and developing a better ability to connect with social 
movements and thus to activate mobilisation potential.  
 
 
3.2 FRANCE 
France represents a particular model of capitalist development which is often labelled 
‘statist’ or ‘state interventionist’ and which is characterised by a republican political culture 
emphasising the public good (Schmidt, 2002: 56). Both of these core features – the ‘statist’ tradition 
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and the republican political culture – became somewhat ‘Europeanised’ in the course of accelerated 
economic integration from the mid-1980s onwards (ibid.). This includes a high degree of 
financialisation and strong transnationalisation of French firms (Jany-Catrice and Lallement, 2012: 
104). It is paired with a very segmented labour market that is particularly segregating with regards to 
vulnerable groups such as immigrants, young people, and to a lesser extent, women (Berrebi-
Hoffmann, Jany-Catrice, Lallement and Ribault, 2009: 197f). The French welfare mix traditionally 
tries to buffer those effects with a strong redistributive element that ranks along the Scandinavian 
welfare states (e.g. Förster and Whiteford, 2009: 38). The state also regulates or steps in for trade 
unions with legally binding minimum wages that are regularly raised. Thus, the state has always 
played an important role in the wage bargaining process as trade unions have traditionally lower 
numbers of members and the general trade union landscape is split across the political spectrum, or, 
in other words, social partners are too weak to regulate the labour market yet powerful enough to 
block unilateral government moves (Amable, 2003: 245). 
The particularities of the French trade union landscape with regards to membership and 
political division is reflected in the membership numbers of trade unions as well as the number of 
French trade unions. The union density rate in France has been around 7.6% for approximately the 
last decade and routine involvement of unions and employers in government decisions is rare or 
absent (Visser: ICTWSS). This resonates with the fact that the right to strike is fixed in the 
constitution and that it is a long standing tradition in French society to regard bodies representing 
particular interests such as those of workers as organisations conflicting with a general interest 
represented by the state (Mény, 1999). Having said that, trade unions traditionally have a high 
mobilisation potential despite of their rather weak structural and institutional power (Béroud and 
Yon, 2012: 170) which is reflected in the classification of France as a ‘strike-prone’ country 
(European Commission, 2010: 47). Those challenges of low membership numbers and a 
comparatively weak bargaining position are not new but there are changes to be observed, too. That 
is, here as well, collective bargaining has become even more decentralised (Jany-Catrice and 
Lallement, 2012: 105). While the state started to refrain from intervention and privatised a lot of 
formerly state-owned firms, it looks like this gap has not been filled by the French trade unions. At 
the same time, the French labour market faces serious challenges, too. Along with the fragmented 
labour market (temporary employees made up for 15.1% of all employees in 2012, eurostat), the 
structurally high unemployment rate (above 8% throughout the 1990s and 2000s, ibid.) is 
problematic. 
So, French trade unions had to face the crisis from a weak position to begin with. France (a 
current account deficit country) was moderately hit by the crisis although its falling rate in GDP was 
exceptionally lower as compared to EU average (France's GDP contracted by 3.1% in 2009, but 
recovered somewhat (+1.7) in 2010 and +2.0 in 2011 until it stagnated at 0 in 2012, eurostat). 
Unemployment rates, however, jumped and are since at a very high level (2013: 10.3%, 2008: 7.5%, 
ibid.). This obviously exacerbates the situation for vulnerable groups in particular, that is, e.g. the 
youth unemployment rate is at 24.8% (in 2013, ibid.). 
In the first phase of the crisis, after some disagreement between trade unions and the 
government as well as between trade unions and employer organisations, certain measures were 
taken extending training opportunities and short-time work arrangements (European Commission, 
2010: 71). In addition to that, strikes – for example those protesting the raise of the retirement age 
– took place and again, trade unions surprised with the mobilisation they could achieve (ibid.: 72). 
Furthermore, seemingly more radical forms of protest were undertaken in some French firms, such as 
‘bossnapping’ (Bossnapping refers to the kidnapping or sequestration of firm managers where 
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managers are held for a few hours up to three days mostly on the firm premises) or bomb threats 
(ibid.: 107). The latter rather piece-meal actions can probably be interpreted as signs of missing 
union organisation as workers apparently felt that in their firm there was no other or better way to 
articulate protest. It is also important to note that those actions although seemingly radical, were 
undertaken in order to achieve very limited demands, that is, higher severance pays and similar 
defensive demands (Ancelovici, 2011: 134). In the second phase of the crisis, trade unions were 
rarely involved in government decisions about public spending cuts. The timing of the French 
presidential and legislative elections presented the electorate with a particular momentum where 
they could express their discontent relatively timely with regards to the second phase of crisis 
management. However, the reform of the retirement age could not be significantly changed and the 
then newly elected president François Hollande has failed to deliver on a lot of his promises, 
especially in reaction to the competitiveness report by former European Aeronautic Defence and 
Space Company (EADS) chef Louis Gallois. In January 2014, Hollande has finally caved to the 
pressures of unfavourable economic and social conditions, his unpopularity and external pressures 
and has announced a variety of measures that are supposed to support enterprises. The employers’ 
organisation Medef seems rather happy with this announcement as this ‘social-liberal turn’ 
(Venturini, 2014) marks the partial success of a long process during which the EU, Germany and 
French employers have exerted pressure on the French government again and again to deregulate the 
labour market and cut wage costs for employers. 
All in all, the responses to the crisis by trade unions in France give a mixed picture. ‘In 
France, unity and disunity have both been evident in the trade union mobilisations. Inevitably, 
internal divisions among the unions have weakened their capacity to shape government responses to 
the crisis’ (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2010: 370). The traditionally low involvement of 
trade unions has not been significantly strengthened during the crisis and is still dependent on 
initiatives by the government. Their pragmatic involvement remained limited while public unrest 
especially with the pension reform was high. Furthermore, since the Front National is in a strong 
position – as the first round of the presidential election in May 2012 and the recent local elections 
in March 2014 as well as the elections for the European Parliament in May 2014, has demonstrated 
– left trade unions as well as parties have a more limited space of manoeuvre. The success of the 
Front National signals that their electorate can no longer be totally ignored but needs to be 
addressed. Many of those (48%, Ifop 2012) who voted Front National in 2012 did so out of general 
protest which shows the problems of the politically divided trade unions to reach those protesters. 
Thus, French unions are in need to develop coherent strategies to address and restrain right-
wing populism. Especially the left trade unions should try to coordinate their actions better and 
maybe even join forces to become more influential on an institutional level as well. Trade unions 
have so far failed to properly use the opportunity of a President and government of the Parti 
Socialiste (PS) in their favour while Hollande has proven a disappointment for progressive actors. 
Meanwhile, plant-level negotiations (ArcelorMittal, Peugeot) and social dialogue (regarding the 
‘modernisation of the labour market’, esp. fixed term contracts in January 2013) have been very 
conflictive and presented unions, above all the left leaning Confédération générale du travail (CGT) 
and the always government-critical Force Ouvrière (FO), with unsatisfactory results. For France, the 
crisis has thus not brought impetus for trade union actions but further exacerbated problems and 
challenges which makes them rather reactive than proactive in formulating demands. Mobilisation 
remains somewhat low after the experience of not being able to avert the pension reform. And while 
trade unions have often shown good connections to the social movement scene (Béroud and Yon, 
2012: 175) mobilisation remains fragmented since 2011 and has not developed an encompassing 
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dynamic. Meanwhile, non-socioeconomic topics mobilise the French as seen in the protests against 
marriage and adoption rights for homosexuals around May 2013. If socioeconomic issues arise, it is 
mainly regional and limited protest and partly mixed with other issues. One example for this was the 
bonnets rouges movement in October 2013 that expressed the fear of consequences from the écotaxe 6 
for the more agrarian Brittany region. With Hollande’s turn and high unemployment trade unions 
now more than ever need to focus their energy on the commonalities in the situations of precarious 
workers, the unemployed and the more secure workers in France and Europe. As the unity of trade 
unions against the pension reform and the crisis reactions came at the expense of a clear political and 
more progressive stance (ibid.: 178), this unity may not be the way forward for emancipatory actors. 
Thus, a transnational coalition of like-minded trade unions and social movement actors might be an 
important strategy for disappointed left trade unions in France. 
 
 
3.3 SPAIN 
Spain shows relatively strong collective bargaining institutions although the system is more 
recent than for example the German one due to the fact that the Franco regime lasted until 1977, 
under which all trade unions, except the Francoist, one were illegal organisations (Lessenich, 1994: 
233). Before the crisis, the Spanish economy had reacted to financialisation and competition 
pressures by European integration and the broader globalisation context and was doing quite well 
according to economic growth figures, employment levels and public budget balance (López and 
Rodríguez, 2011: 5). However, the high degree of financialisation in combination with a dependent 
construction sector as second pillar operated in a context of a much segmented labour market. 
Thus, certain predetermined breaking points were incorporated in the Spanish growth model 
(Banyuls and Recio, 2012: 201f, López and Rodríguez, 2011: 9f). The relatively consequent 
liberalisation and deregulation of the Spanish economy was supported by a monetarist block that at 
the same time tried to establish a modern but financialized and unsustainable welfare state 
(Fernández Steinko, 2009). The labour market is characterised by a very high degree of 
fragmentation and precarisation. This was not so much buffered by the post-authoritarian welfare 
state which is very fragmented and relies heavily on the self-responsibility of individuals (Lessenich, 
1994: 239). 
A ‘pattern of cooperation in economic and social policymaking among the social actors 
(government, trade unions, and employers’ associations)’ has contributed to a political culture 
aiming at greater compromise (Royo, 2009: 436f). This is also reflected in the trade union landscape 
which is less politically divided and fragmented than the French one. The union density rate in Spain 
is about 15.9% and it has levelled around that figure for at least a decade (Visser: ICTWSS). 
Furthermore, in contrast to France, unions and employers are regularly and frequently involved in 
government decisions on social and economic policy (ibid.). Trade unions have more and more 
relied on ‘growing institutional embeddedness and implicitly accept[ed] chronically low membership 
levels’ (Köhler and Calleja Jiménez, 2010: 553). As a consequence, unions were unable to take on 
board those in atypical employment (in 2012: 23.7% of Spanish workers were temporary employees, 
eurostat) which is especially problematic in Spain due to the high dualisation and precarisation of 
the labour market in connection with a limited welfare state. 
Due to its high degree of financialisation the Spanish economy was severely hit by the 
financial crisis. It was, however, less the integration in global financial markets but the unequal 
development and the imbalances within the eurozone which made the recession in Spain − a current 
account deficit country with high levels of private debt − so severe. As a consequence of crisis-
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induced de-financialisation, the drying out of foreign credits and the bursting of their very own 
housing bubble, the GDP contracted by 3.7% in 2009, ending a 16-year growth trend, and by 
another 0.3% in 2010, before turning positive (0.4%) in 2011 but going negative again in 2012: -
1.6% (eurostat) while the unemployment rate climbed accordingly (2013: 26.4%, as opposed to 
2008: 11.3%, ibid.). Vulnerable groups especially young people were hit even harder (youth 
unemployment was at 55.7% in 2013, ibid.). This ‘lost generation’ falls back on the support of their 
families or leaves the country. 
As the crisis spread, collective bargaining institutions failed to deliver buffer measures. In 
2009, no compromise was reached during the negotiation rounds (Visser: ICTWSS). In 2010, the 
socialist government implemented strict austerity measures while tripartite negotiations failed 
(Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2010: 369). Hence, Spanish trade unions have lost influence 
especially in this second phase of the reactions to the crisis (Huke, 2013). Labour market reforms 
have included a massive decentralisation (Schulten and Müller, 2013: 198) of the bargaining system 
through promoting bargaining at company level and imposing an arbitrator to find a solution where 
no agreement can be found (Banyuls and Recio, 2012: 213). Trade unions organised several strikes 
and general strikes but those remained with limited attendance and support (Huke, 2013). 
Meanwhile, the strictness of the austerity measures and other consequences of the crisis have 
activated quite some mobilisation potential for social movements. The indignados or 15-M are a 
famous example (Espinar and Abellan, 2012: 135). This movement represented a group that is 
traditionally difficult to attract by trade unions: young people, the unemployed and those who had 
lost their homes in the bursting of the housing bubble (ibid.: 137). Protesters criticised the political 
process in Spain, the management of the crisis and housing evictions. 
Spanish trade unions had to operate between pragmatic involvement and public unrest. 
While collective bargaining failed, trade unions were unable to really capitalise on the mobilisation 
potential as the majority of the public regarded them as closely connected to the socialist 
government under Zapatero. This government first hesitated but then implemented aggressive 
austerity measures (López and Rodríguez, 2011: 24), with the result of not being re-elected in 
November 2011. Thus, trade unions lost a lot of both their structural and institutional power 
during the crisis. They also failed to connect themselves properly with the social movements that 
appeared at the time, which is probably also due to the fact that they were seen as affiliated to the 
government against which protesters went out on the streets. As unemployment numbers in Spain 
are still on alarming levels combined with the aggressive restructuring of the industrial relations 
system by the conservative government under Rajoy (Köhler and Calluja Jiménez, 2013: 16), trade 
unions remain in a weak position. 
All in all, it seems as if Spain is in the firm hands of the market-liberal restructuring pushed 
by the EU troika and other actors. Although trade unions have managed to organise some strikes 
their influence remains especially low as the restructuring measures include a weakening of the 
collective bargaining system and collective bargaining coverage which adds to the challenges 
mentioned above (Busch et al., 2013). Those reforms will have a lasting effect on collective 
bargaining institutions as well as the scarring experience produced by the helplessness of trade 
unions and societies during the crisis. Furthermore, resignation and despair has been spreading in the 
Spanish society which has slowed down the overall conflict dynamic (Huke 2014). However, we 
would still like to refrain from declaring the patient dead in calling Spain or Southern Europe ‘post-
corporatist’. Trade unions remain an important pillar in articulating the interests of the working 
class and albeit their position is being undermined, they remain standing. The Social Summit, 
Cumbre Social, is one example of trade unions joining forces with the remaining parts of the 15-M 
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movement. A more decisive reorientation than what has been attempted so far (ibid.) might also be 
helpful for the influence of Spanish trade unions. 
 
 
4. Conclusions and prospects 
In our discussion above on the three cases of Germany, France and Spain, we have shown 
that the trajectories of labour relations within the EU, even within the Eurozone, differed to a 
remarkable extent. While in the economically stronger current account surplus countries such as 
Germany the social partners built upon former competitive corporatist arrangements, these 
arrangements proved to be non-sustainable in the extremely crisis-ridden current account deficit 
countries in the Southern member states. This shows that the overall socioeconomic situation may 
not determine the strategic choice of trade unions, but certainly has a strong impact. Hence, against 
the background of inherited institutional and political cultural traditions the turn towards ‘crisis 
corporatism’ is not only marked by a relatively good institutional and organisational power but also 
by a weak mobilisation power that is related with a rather modest stance when it comes to the 
sociopolitical trade unions demands. For our ‘post corporatist’ case, mobilisation seems to be the 
last straw that is still partly functional while trade union rights are heavily cut off and organisational 
power is confronted with a bleak looking employment rate and significant loss of trust. Looking at 
the French case, we see a very mixed picture which is related to the specific tradition and societal 
role of trade unions in France. The differences between the influence of trade unions as well as the 
overall situation their country finds itself in make a trans-European mobilisation difficult. 
 
Table 4: Position of Trade Unions within specific Models of Capitalism 
 
 Germany France Spain 
Institutional power Relatively strong Weak Moderate (and declining) 
Structural power Relatively strong  
(but declining) 
Mixed/weak  
(and declining) 
Moderate 
Mobilisation 
power 
Relatively weak Strong Moderate and significantly 
declining during crisis 
Political divide 
among trade 
unions 
Small Big Small 
General political 
trend within trend 
unions 
Corporatist/reformist Fragmented, loss of 
radicalism -> large parts: 
reformist 
Corporatist/reformist 
Reactions to crisis Social dialogue, 
participation in design of 
stimulus programmes 
Protests and social 
dialogue, both moderately 
successful 
Failure of both social 
dialogue and mobilisation 
efforts 
Changing role 
during the crisis 
Strengthening of role 
during first crisis phase, 
slightly more powerful in 
second phase than 
before crisis but will it 
last? 
Business as usual Weakening of role during 
crisis: massive intervention 
into industrial relations by 
austerity policies; lost foot in 
the door with both 
government and societal 
actors (social movements). 
Concept Crisis-corporatist Sporadic public protest Post-corporatism 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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In a way, the outlined cases can be taken as symptomatic for the overall situation of trade 
unions within the EU.7 They show that unions tend to confine their activities to the domestic arena 
and have difficulties to develop coherent, European-oriented and transnationally linked strategic 
practices. Obviously, the barriers of transnational co-operation as well as the strategic drift are quite 
serious. Nevertheless, there are also chances and starting points such as common problems, cross-
border discourses, activities and learning processes which may all contribute to transcend nationally 
confined forms of political thinking. At least a few aspects and developments support this view. 
First, on average the traditionally corporatist and meanwhile crisis-corporatist countries have 
a stronger membership base than the crisis-ridden post-corporatist countries in the Southern 
European periphery. However, while in the latter trade unions have learnt to live with low density 
rates, also in the remaining production sectors, by applying public mobilisation practices, the 
institutional and organisational power of their counterparts in the still corporatist core seems to 
wither. Indicators of this trend are not only the far-reaching concessions within corporatist 
negotiations, but also decreasing membership rates (Table 1).  
Secondly, and next to similarity of challenges, there is reason to assume that − in terms of 
success and failure − both types of unions can mutually learn from each other. While the presumably 
strong unions in corporatist countries have certain deficiencies of political articulation, the crisis-
ridden unions in post-corporatist settings dispose of manifold experiences and public mobilization 
techniques which can be built upon under conditions of generalized austerity within the EU 
(Lehndorff, 2013). In that context, new modes of action may arise. Cooperation of trade unions and 
social movements may not only include joint demonstrations and strikes but also common activities 
on a local or regional level in the field of education, health, social, or housing policies where the 
Southern European states are markedly retreating.  
Thirdly, in view of the particular country-specific mixture of economic, social, and political 
conditions and challenges, European unions have no single ‘best practice’ they can resort to. At the 
same time, the country-specific particularities should neither be exaggerated. Irrespective of all 
differences, the public awareness of the transnational nature of the European crisis and therefore the 
search for common answers tends to increase in view of daily reports in the media, the dense 
succession of European crisis summits and overall cuts in public employment and social expenses. 
Even if one common reaction towards the crisis is the resort to right-wing populist slogans, this can 
be interpreted as a general European development which requires common strategic reactions. 
Finally, there are also some political initiatives and practices which point to the indicated 
direction. For instance, since the outbreak of the crisis there have been about six European days of 
action which aligned trade unions and social movements in transnationally articulated protest and 
resistance against the prevailing austerity agenda and the continued power of financial markets 
(Pedrina, 2012). These activities have also been promoted by the European Trade Union Congress 
(ETUC) which has launched quite a few strategic papers and initiatives over the last years. In a way, 
this indicates a certain reorientation as the ETUC has become much more political and autonomous 
vis-à-vis supranational institutions such as the European Commission. 
All these aspects and trends show that, although not completely wrong, it may be misleading 
to assume a strict and already fixed separation of European trade union strategies. On closer 
inspection, the overall picture is much more complicated and partially confusing, as neither the 
‘crisis corporatist’ nor the ‘post-corporatist’ orientation provides the way out of the given 
constellation of generalised austerity within the EU. Besides, there are quite a few cases, such as 
France, which fit in none of the alternative strategic options. Instead of pitting both options against 
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each other, European trade unions may better utilise the unclear situation by promoting public 
debates and concrete political struggles and alliances in favour of their demands of employees. 
Depending on the concrete policy content, those alliances may, on the one hand, be with 
governments and employers’ organisations in the observed form of ‘crisis corporatism’. On the other 
hand, they may be with the social movements in the form of ‘movement unionism’. What choice is 
taken is certainly influenced by national socioeconomic and institutional preconditions; at the same 
time, European trade unions may converge in their political engagement and alliance formation, if 
they focus on overcoming the socially repressive European constellation of generalised austerity and 
its regressive distributional implications. This would be a precondition to playing a more 
emancipatory role and inducing more far reaching struggles in European societies. 
 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1.  We thank Laura Horn and Mónica Clua Losada as well as two anonymous referees for helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
 
2.  On the different dimensions and resources of trade union power see Brinkmann et al. 2008. 
 
3.  In the general public, most politicians, journalists, or academics of different kinds now see the 
roots of the current crisis in rising public debt caused by too generous public sectors and social 
welfare regimes. Consequently, they plead for downsizing the public sector, cutting social 
expenditures and restricting wages and labour rights in order to accomplish two goals: first, the 
consolidation of public budgets; and second, improved international competitiveness through 
reduced wages and non-wage labour costs. 
 
4.  Central and Eastern European economies which, apart from Slovenia, dispose of a very weak or 
only symbolic corporatist past cannot be taken into account in this paper. For an overview see 
Bohle/Greskovits 2012. 
 
5.  The aim of our analysis is not to undertake a comparative case study in order to identify causal 
chains but rather to reflect on the preconditions to successfully implementing crisis or post 
corporatist strategies in three very important member states of the EU. 
 
6.  Discussions around the écotaxe included a possible introduction of a tax for supermarkets to pay 
for products by the distance those had travelled. The producers of agricultural commodities in 
Brittany feared that supermarkets, e.g. in Southern France would transfer those costs onto 
them. 
 
7.  The situation is even worse if the orientation of Scandinavian unions is added to the picture. 
Although still fairly strong in terms of membership they are generally sceptical to develop 
common European strategies, as they are afraid that any kind of stronger European influence 
would further undermine their domestic welfare and labour regimes. 
  170
 
REFERENCES 
 
Amable, B. (2003) The Diversity of modern Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Ancelovici, M. (2011) ‘In Search of Lost Radicalism: The Hot Autumn of 2010 and the 
Transformation of Labor Contention in France’, French Politics, Culture & Society. 29(3): 
121-140. 
 
Baccaro, L., Boyer, R., Crouch, C., Regini, M., Marginson, P., Hyman, R., Gumbrell-McCormick, 
R. and Milkman, R. (2010) ‘Discussion Forum I: Labour and the global financial crisis’, 
Socio-Economic Review. 8(2): 341-376. 
 
Banyuls, J. and Recio, A. (2012) ‘Spain – the nightmare of Mediterranean capitalism’, in Lehndorff, 
S. (ed.) A triumph of failed ideas – European models of capitalism in crisis. Brussels: ETUI, 199-
217. 
 
Becker, J. and Jäger, J. (2010) ‘Development Trajectories in the Crisis in Europe’, Debatte: Journal of 
Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe. 18(1): 5-27. 
 
Becker, J. and Jäger, J. (2012) ‘Integration in Crisis: A Regulationist Perspective on the Interaction 
of European Varieties of Capitalism’, Competition & Change. 16(3): 169-187. 
 
Bellofiore, R., Garibaldo, F. and Halevi, J. (2010) ‘The Great Recession and the Contradictions of 
European Neomercantilism’, in Panitch, L.; Albo, G. and Chibber, V. (eds.) Socialist Register 
2011. The Crisis This Time. London: Merlin Press, pp. 120-146. 
 
Béroud, S., Yon, K. (2012) ‘Face à la crise, la mobilisation sociale et ses limites. Une analyse des 
contradictions syndicales’, Modern & Contemporary France, 20(2): 169-183. 
 
Berrebi-Hoffmann, I., Jany-Catrice, F., Lallement, M. and Ribault, Th. (2009) ‘Capitalising on 
Variety: Risks and opportunities in a new French Social Model’, in Bosch, G., Lehndorff, S. 
and Rubery, J. (eds.) European Employment Models in Flux – A Comparison of Institutional 
Change in Nine European Countries. Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 178-
200. 
 
Bieler, A. (2011) ‘Labour, new social movements and the resistance to neo-liberal restructuring in 
Europe’, New Political Economy. 16(2): 163-183.  
 
Bieling, H.-J. (2011) ‘Vom Krisenmanagement zur neuen Konsolidierungsagenda der EU’, Prokla. 
41(2): 173-194. 
 
Bieling, H.-J. and Schulten, T. (2003) ‘Competitive Restructuring and Industrial Relations within 
the European Union: Corporatist Involvement and Beyond?’, in Cafruny, A. and Ryner, M. 
(eds.) A Ruined Fortress. Neoliberal Hegemony and Transformation in Europe. Boulder: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 231-259. 
  171
 
Bohle, D. and Greskovits, B. (2012) Capitalist Diversity on Europe's Periphery. Cornell: Cornell 
University Press. 
 
Brinkmann, U., Choi, H.-L., Detje, R., Dörre, K., Holst, H., Karakayali, S. and Schmalstieg, C. 
(2008) Strategic Unionism: Aus der Krise zur Erneuerung der Gewerkschaften? - Umrisse eines 
Forschungsprogramms. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 
 
Bundesregierung (2013) Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und 
SPD. 18. Legislaturperiode. Available at http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/ 
StatischeSeiten/Breg/koalitionsvertrag-inhaltsverzeichnis.html, [Accessed 7 February 2014]. 
 
Busch, K., Hermann, C., Hinrichs, K. and Schulten, T. (2013) ‘Euro Crisis, Austerity Policy and 
the European Social Model. How Crisis Policies in Southern Europe Threaten the EU’s 
Social Dimension’, International Policy Analysis, February 2013. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung. 
 
Butterwegge, C. (2006) Krise und Zukunft des Sozialstaats. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. 
 
Cafruny, A.W. and Ryner, M. (2007) Europe at Bay. In the Shadow of US Hegemony. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner. 
 
Carley, M. and Marginson, P. (2011) ‘Negotiating the crisis: social partner responses’, in European 
Commission (ed.) Industrial Relations in Europe 2010. Commission Staff Working Paper, 
Brussels, 03.03.2011, SEC(2011) 292 final, 109-156. 
 
Degryse, Ch., Jepsen, M. and Pochet, P. (2013) The Euro crisis and its impact on national and 
European social policies. Working Paper 2013.05, Brussels: ETUI. 
 
Ebbinghaus, B. and Göbel, C. (2014) ‘Mitgliederrückgang und Organisationsstrategien deutscher 
Gewerkschaften’, in Schroeder, W. (ed.) Handbuch Gewerkschaften in Deutschland. 2nd 
edition. Wiesbaden: Springer VS, pp. 207–239. 
 
Erne, R. (2008) European Unions. Labor’s Quest for a Transnational Democracy. Ithaka; London: ILR 
Press, Cornell University Press. 
 
Erne, R. (2012) ‘European Unions after the Global Crisis’, in Burroni, L.; Keune, M.; Meardi, G. 
(eds.) Economy and Society in Europe: A Relationship in Crisis. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 
124-139. 
 
Espinar, R. and Abellán, J. (2012) ‘Lo llaman democracia y no lo es – Eine demokratietheoretische 
Annäherung an die Bewegung des 15. Mai’, Prokla. 42(1): 135-150. 
 
European Commission (2010) Industrial Relations in Europe 2010. [Online] Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=575&langId=en [Accessed 2 May 2012]. 
 
  172
European Commission (2013) European Economic Forecast, Winter 2013, European Economy No. 1. 
[Online] Available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/ 
2013/ee1_en.htm [Accessed: 7 April 2014]. 
 
Eurostat (no year) Database. [Online] Available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/ 
portal/statistics/search_database [Accessed: 7 April 2014]. 
 
Fernández Steinko, A. (2009) ‘Financial Crisis and the Remaking of the Society of Labour in Spain’, 
in transform! [Online] Available at http://transform-network.net/de/blog/archiv-2009/news/ 
detail/Blog/financial-crisis-and-the-remaking-of-the-society-of-labour-in-spain-1.html 
[Accessed: 7 April 2014]. 
 
Förster, M. and Whiteford, P. (2009) ‘How much redistribution do welfare states achieve? The role 
of cash transfers and household taxes’, CESifo DICE Report 3/2009. [Online] Available at 
http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/1192920.PDF [Accessed: 4 June 
2012]. 
 
Gajewska, K. (2008) ‘The Emergence of a European Labour Protest Movement?’, European Journal 
of Industrial Relations. 14(1): 104-121. 
 
Glassner, V. (2013) ‘Central and eastern European industrial relations in the crisis: national 
divergence and path-dependent change’, Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research. 
19(2): 155-169. 
 
Glassner, V.; Keune, M. and Marginson, P. (2011) ‘Collective bargaining in a time of crisis: 
developments in the private sector in Europe’, Transfer: European Review of Labour and 
Research. 17(3): 303-321. 
 
Hacker, B. and van Treeck, T. (2010) ‘What influence for European governance? The Reformed 
Stability and Growth Pact, the Europe 2020 Strategy and the “European Semester”’, 
International Policy Analysis, December 2010. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. [Online] 
Available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07724.pdf [Accessed: 2 May 2012]. 
 
Hassel, A. (2009) ‘Policies and Politics in Social Pacts in Europe’, European Journal of Industrial 
Relations. 15(1): 7-26. 
 
Heinrich, M. and Kutter, A. (2014) ‘A Critical Juncture in EU Integration? The Eurozone Crisis 
and Its Management 2010-12’, in Panizza, F. and Philip, G. (eds.) Moments of Truth: The 
Politics of Financial Crisis in Comparative Perspective. London: Routledge, pp. 120-139. 
 
Heise, A. and Lierse, H. (2011) ‘The Effects of European Austerity Programmes on Social Security 
Systems’, Modern Economy. 2(4): 498-513. 
 
Hermann, C. (2013) Crisis, structural reform and the dismantling of the European Social Model(s). 
Working Paper, Institute for International Political Economy. Berlin, No. 26/2013. 
 
  173
Huke, N. (2013) ‘Autoritäre Austeritätspolitik in der Euro-Krise als Herausforderung für 
Gewerkschaften und soziale Bewegungen: Das Fallbeispiel Spanien’, in Friedrich, W.; 
Schwarz, Ch. H. and Voigt, S. (eds.) Gewerkschaften im demokratischen Prozess. Düsseldorf: 
Hans-Böckler-Stiftung. 
 
Huke, N. (2014) Zwischen hilflosem sozialen Dialog und vorsichtiger Radikalisierung. Die spanischen 
Mehrheitsgewerkschaften CC.OO. und UGT in der Eurokrise. Unpublished manuscript. 
 
Hyman, R. (2000) ‘The Europeanisation – or the erosion – of industrial relations?’, Industrial 
Relations Journal. 32(4): 280-294. 
 
Hyman, R. and Gumbrell-McCormick, R. (2010) ‘Trade unions and the crisis: a lost opportunity?’, 
Socio-Economic Review. 8(2): 364-372. 
 
Ifop 2012, sondages en France – Front National. [Online] Available at http://www.sondages-en-
france.fr/sondages/Partis/Front%20National [Accessed: 8 May 2012]. 
 
ILO (2013) World of Work Report 2013. Repairing the economic and social fabric. Genf: ILO. 
 
Jany-Catrice, F. and Lallement, M. (2012) ‘France confronts the crisis: economic symptoms 
exacerbate social inequality’, in Lehndorff, S. (ed.) A triumph of failed ideas – European models 
of capitalism in crisis. Brussels: ETUI, pp. 103-119. 
 
Köhler, H.-D. and Calleja Jiménez, J.P. (2010) ‘Organizing heterogeneity: challenges for the 
Spanish trade unions’, Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research. 16(4): 541-557. 
 
Köhler, H.-D. and Calleja Jiménez, J.P. (2013) Trade Unions in Spain. Organisation, Environment, 
Challenges. Study, Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 
 
Lehndorff, S. (2012) ‘German capitalism and the European crisis: part of the solution or part of the 
problem’, in Lehndorff, S. (ed.) A triumph of failed ideas – European models of capitalism in 
crisis. Brussels: ETUI, pp. 79-102. 
 
Lehndorff, S. (2013) ‘Verschiedene Welten? Gewerkschaften in der europäischen Krise’, Das 
Argument, 55(1-2): 181-199. 
 
Lehndorff, S., Bosch, G., Haipeter, T. and Latniak, E. (2009) ‘From the ‘Sick Man’ to the 
‘Overhauled Engine’ of Europe? Upheaval in the German Model’, in Bosch, G.; Lehndorff, 
S. and Rubery, J. (eds.) European Employment Models in Flux – A Comparison of Institutional 
Change in Nine European Countries. Basingstoke and  New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 
105-130. 
 
Lessenich, S. (1994) ‘Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism – oder vier? Strukturwandel arbeits- und 
sozialpolitischer Regulierungsmuster in Spanien’, Politische Vierteljahresschrift. 35(2): 224-
244. 
 
  174
López, I. and Rodríguez, E. (2011) ‘The Spanish Model’, New Left Review, 69 (May/June): 5-28. 
 
Martin, A. (1996) European Institutions and the Europeanisation of Trade Unions: Support or Seduction? 
Discussion and working papers 96.04.1, Brussels: ETUI. 
 
Mény, Y. (1999) ‘Interessengruppen in Frankreich: von Pluralismus keine Spur’, in Christadler, M. 
and Uterwedde, H. (eds.) Länderbericht Frankreich. Geschichte, Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft. 
Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung (Schriftenreihe, Bd. 360), pp. 348-362. 
 
Pedrina, V. (2012) ‘The euro crisis and the European trade union movement’, in Pons-Vignon, N. 
and Ncumbe, P. (eds.) Confronting finance. Mobilizing the 99 per cent for economic and social 
progress. Genf: ILO, pp. 7-10. 
 
Rhodes, M. (1998) ‘Globalization, Labour Markets and Welfare States: A Future of “Competititve 
Corporatism”’, in Rhodes, M. and Mény, Y. (ed.) The Future of European Welfare: A New 
Social Contract? London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 178-203. 
 
Ross, G. (1995) Jacques Delors and European Integration. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Royo, S. (2009) ‘Reforms Betrayed? Zapatero and Continuities in Economic Policy’, South 
European Society and Politics. 14(4): 435-451. 
 
Schelkle, W. (2012) ‘Good governance in crisis or a good crisis for governance? A comparison of the 
EU and the US’, Review of International Political Economy. 19(1): 34-58. 
 
Schmalz, S. and Weinmann, N. (2013) ‘Zwei Krisen, zwei Kampfzyklen: Gewerkschaftsproteste in 
Westeuropa im Vergleich’, in Schmalz, S. and Dörre, K. (eds.) Comeback der Gewerkschaften. 
Machtressourcen, innovative Praktiken, internationale Perspektiven. Frankfurt; New York: 
Campus, pp. 76-98. 
 
Schmidt, I. (2011) ‘European Capitalism: Varieties of Crisis’, Alternate Routes – A Journal of Critical 
Research. 22: 71-86. 
 
Schmidt, V. A. (2002) The Futures of European Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Schulten, T. (2002) ‘A European Solidaristic Wage Policy?’, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 
8(2): 173-196. 
 
Schulten, T. and Müller, T. (2013) ‘A new European Interventionism? The impact of the New 
European Economic Governance on Wages and Collective Bargaining’, in Natali, D. and 
Vanhercke, B. (eds.) Social Developments in the European Union 2012. Brussels: ETUI, pp. 
181-213. 
 
Simonis, G. (ed.) (1998) Deutschland nach der Wende. Neue Politikstrukturen. Opladen: Leske & 
Budrich. 
 
  175
Theodoropoulou, S. and Watt, A. (2011) Withdrawal Symptoms: an Assessment of the Austerity 
Packages in Europe. ETUI Working Paper 02, Brussels: ETUI. 
 
Urban, H.-J. (2012) ‘Crisis corporatism and trade union revitalisation in Europe’, in Lehndorff, S. 
(ed.) A triumph of failed ideas. European models of capitalism in crisis. Brussels: ETUI, pp. 219-
241. 
 
Uterwedde, H. (2009) ‘Sarkozys Wirtschafts- und Sozialreformen. Eine Zwischenbilanz’, Aktuelle 
Frankreich Analysen Nummer 22. Deutsch-Französisches Institut, Januar 2009. [Online] 
Available at http://www.dfi.de/pdf-Dateien/Veroeffentlichungen/afa/afa22.pdf [Accessed: 3 
May 2012]. 
 
Venturini, L. (2014) ‘Hollande, le tournant social-libéral’, L’Humanité. [Online] Available at 
http://www.humanite.fr/politique/hollande-le-tournant-social-liberal-557136 [Accessed: 27 
January 2014]. 
 
Visser, J. ICTWSS: Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State 
Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 countries between 1960 and 2007, Version 3.0. (updated 
untill 2010), Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS), University of 
Amsterdam. [Online] Available at http://www.uva-aias.net/208 [Accessed: 27 January 
2014]. 
 
 
 
 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE  
 
PROF. DR. HANS-JÜRGEN BIELING is professor for Politik und Wirtschaft (Political 
Economy) and Wirtschaftsdidaktik at the Institute of Political Science at the University of 
Tübingen in Germany. His research interests comprise International Political Economy and 
European Integration. [email: Hans-Juergen.Bieling@uni-tuebingen.de] 
 
JULIA LUX is a PhD candidate and research associate at the Institute of Political Science at the 
University of Tübingen in Germany. Her research interests comprise Comparative Capitalism 
Research and Gender Issues. [email: Julia.Lux@uni-tuebingen.de] 
 
 
